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Abstract
Uganda and in particular the Ugandan police are perceived 
as highly corrupt. To address the integrity of police officers, 
an intervention called the Police Accountability and Reform 
Project (PARP) was implemented in selected police districts 
between 2010 and early 2013. This paper studies the impact 
of PARP for a sample of 600 police officers who were in-
terviewed about police integrity by means of 12 hypotheti-
cal vignette cases depicting context-specific, undesirable 
behavior of varying degrees of severity. The assessments 
of the cases by the police officers are analyzed using pro-
pensity score matching, inverse probability weighting, and 
seemingly unrelated regression techniques. We show that 
the self-selection of police officers into the program is un-
likely to drive the results. The results suggest that officers 
participating in PARP activities (1) judge the presented 
cases of misconduct more severely, (2) are more inclined 
to report misconduct, and (3) also expect their colleagues 
to judge misbehavior at the police level more critically al-
though the latter two coefficient estimates are smaller in 
size. This suggests that PARP activities have affected the 
perception of police officers but only encouraged them 
moderately to actually take action against bad practices.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Integrity and accountability of public servants are key to discussions on “good governance” or “good 
government” (Holmberg and Rothstein, 2012). Integrity is normally understood as “the quality of 
acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules” and can be a quality of individ-
uals and organizations (Lasthuizen et al., 2011: 387). Corruption, generically defined as “the abuse 
of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2016a), is a prominent aspect of 
public integrity, because there is almost-universal agreement that this signals a serious governance 
quality deficit. The fight against corruption is seen as important not only for the performance of the 
public sector but also for development more generally and is therefore included among the Sustainable 
Development Goals (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 5).
Traditionally, the police has received much attention in discussions about integrity because of its 
central role among the instruments of the state, in particular its “strong arm.” The functioning of the 
police, and more specifically the curbing of malpractice of its officers, is a measure of governance 
quality because of the centrality of the rule of law and law enforcement (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 
2016: 81–82).
Previous research on police integrity has focused on (un)acceptable behavior (Klockars et al., 2000, 
2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2005a, 2005b), as well as on the impact of organizational characteristics and 
the external environment on police officers’ attitudes (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković 
and O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 
2015). Recent literature on the topic has also zoomed in on the extent to which policing reforms may 
reduce police misconduct (Collins et al., 2016) next to focusing on how corrupt officials respond to 
accountability mechanisms that increase the moral costs of misconduct (Olken and Pande, 2012).
The current paper contributes to the literature on public integrity and policing by analyzing a 
specific intervention, the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP), implemented in Uganda 
between 2010 and 2013. PARP provided training to police officers and expanded contact with social 
stakeholders, thus aiming to influence the attitudes of Ugandan police officers on corruption and 
associated integrity violations.
A main challenge of the crime and justice literature is to identify how integrity-enhancing mea-
sures impact on the behavior of public servants. Our attempt to identify causal effects rests on a qua-
si-experimental design. In line with earlier research on police integrity, and building on the approach 
introduced by Klockars et al. (2000), we do not ask police officers about their own policing practices 
and those of others but present them with hypothetical cases that they are asked to assess. Propensity 
score matching (PSM) is applied to assess the impact of PARP. We find systematic observable dif-
ferences in police integrity between PARP participants and non-participants, which suggest that par-
ticipants (1) judge the presented cases of misconduct more severely, (2) are more inclined to report 
misconduct, and (3) expect their colleagues to judge misbehavior at the police level more critically. 
The results are most pronounced for normative judgments of case severity; they are reduced when it 
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comes to actual reporting of misconduct. Thus, PARP was successful in diffusing knowledge about 
proper policing and human rights, which is demonstrated by the finding that more severe cases of 
integrity violations are judged more rigorously.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we situate our study in the liter-
ature on police integrity. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the Ugandan national police, whereas 
PARP is introduced in section 4. Sampling and survey are described in section 5, and descriptive 
statistics are presented in section 6. The empirical model is outlined in section 7. The results are dis-
cussed in section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 |  SITUATING THE STUDY
Research on the quality of policing has focused on (degrees of) integrity to get around the problem 
of studying actual acts of corruption and breaches of integrity. Building on the work of scholars such 
as Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a), our study includes forms of corruption 
such as bribery but further extends to other integrity issues such as the maltreatment of suspects. We 
use Kutnjak Ivković’s (2005a: 16) definition of police corruption as “an action or omission, a promise 
of action or omission, or an attempted action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group 
of police officers, characterized by the police officer’s misuse of the official position, motivated in 
significant part by the achievement of personal gain.” Police integrity is understood as “the normative 
inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation” 
(Klockars et al., 2006: 1).
Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) have argued that research should focus on police integrity rather than 
corruption, because the so-called “administrative/individual approach,” which aims at measuring the 
level of corrupt behavior, encounters “enormous . . . obstacles” (Klockars et al., 2000: 3). The prob-
lems are illustrated in research that has tried to measure corruption by recording experiences in a 
survey (Tankebe, 2010), assessing activities through analyzing written records (McMillan and Zoido, 
2004), or accompanying corrupt individuals and observing the payment of bribes (Olken and Barron, 
2009). An “organizational/occupational approach” lends itself to asking “questions of fact and opin-
ion that can be explored directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt 
behaviour are likely to provoke” (Klockars et al., 2000: 3).
Although most earlier studies have mainly described the level of police integrity and misconduct, 
contemporary studies seek explanations of differences among groups of officers at the meso- and 
macro-level related to characteristics of police precincts, gender and race differences, and attitudes 
(Gottschalk, 2010; Hickman et al., 2016a, 2016b). Studies on non-Western countries have mainly fo-
cused on measuring police integrity within specific types of countries or regions, and specific regimes 
and institutional cultures (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 21–27). These studies aimed at establishing a rela-
tionship of a variety of factors with police integrity. Such factors include differences between super-
visors and line officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, 
and South Africa (Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013); individual characteristics of officers in 
South Korea and Turkey (Cetinkaya 2010); gender differences in Romania (Andreescu et al., 2012b); 
characteristics of organizational culture of police agencies in Turkey (Kucukuysal, 2008); and differ-
ences between urban and rural areas in Armenia (Kutnjak Ivković and Khechumyan, 2014).
Kutnjak Ivković (2015: 18–27) has presented a comprehensive overview of the variety of research 
designs applied in the studies on police integrity in the tradition of Klockars et al. (2000, 2006); her 
overview has not, however, identified a single study that assesses the impact of an intervention that 
aims at enhancing police integrity. Our study focuses on a police reform project in Uganda. Contrary 
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to earlier studies we compare participants benefitting from the intervention with non-participants, 
making use of information about individual police officers, their police stations, and district charac-
teristics to control for confounding factors stemming from these levels.
We build on the method that was pioneered by Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković 
(2005a, 2005b). The approach is based on presenting a series of “vignette cases”—short hypothetical 
descriptions of forms of police misconduct—to police officers and registering their responses on 
the seriousness of the behavior that is described and their willingness to report police officers who 
are responsible for the misconduct. The cases range from small-scale bribery to traffic offences, and 
from robbery to murder. Our survey questions ask for an assessment of the cases based on officers’ 
judgments about good policing and perceived best practices. Thus, instead of framing the survey as 
an assessment of police corruption, it was presented as a review of the challenges that police officers 
face. The advantage of the approach is the uniformity and resulting comparability of case assessments 
across individual officers. Because all officers assess identical scenarios, we can directly compare 
their judgments within each of the 12 cases.
By focusing on Uganda, this study aims to enhance our knowledge about police integrity in 
the non-Western world. In recent years, the attention for policing in developing countries has in-
creased (Tankebe, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2012, 2014; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015; Collins 
et al., 2016), but there has been limited research on Africa or lower-income countries. Kutnjak 
Ivković’s (2015: 18–27) overview indicates that the vignette-based analysis has been used in 23 
countries, including the United States where the approach was developed and most studies were 
conducted. Of the 23 countries, only 8 are outside Europe and North America, and only 2 are from 
sub-Saharan Africa.1  Studies on Eritrea and Pakistan have concentrated on measuring police in-
tegrity (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 22–23). South Africa has received more attention from researchers 
resulting in studies about police integrity in the Johannesburg area and at the national level; there 
is also a study about the code of silence in the South African police force (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 
23–24).2  Given the dearth of research done in sub-Saharan Africa, it seems relevant to obtain 
further evidence from countries on the continent. As Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2015: 365) 
have observed, “The contours of police integrity vary across the world. What is acceptable and 
tolerated in one country or one police agency may not be acceptable at all in another, and may be 
disciplined severely.”
3 |  BACKGROUND: THE UGANDA NATIONAL POLICE
The 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector corruption 
worldwide, included Uganda in the top quintile of most corrupt countries (Transparency International, 
2016b). The Ugandan police is regarded as particularly corrupt (Wambua, 2015; Basheka, 2013; 
Transparency International-Kenya, 2013). Surveys of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 
(2006a) demonstrated that a majority of Ugandan citizens perceive the police as the most corrupt 
institution in the country.
The Ugandan police force, which was institutionalized in 1906 (Uganda Police Force, 2007), is 
divided functionally into 20 directorates based on tasks and geographically into regional and dis-
trict units (Uganda Police, 2015). In the early 2000s, Uganda had fewer than 15,000 police offi-
cers (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006b). At the end of 2014, the inspector general 
announced the expansion of the police to 65,000 officers (Kakamwa, 2014).
In 2013, the crime rate was 273 per 100,000 Ugandans with public sector crime investigations 
being on the rise. The Ugandan police reported 413 investigations in 2013, compared to 214 in 2012. 
66 |   WAGNER Et Al.
The Ugandan Police (2013) mentioned 19 cases in which police officers were under investigation of 
suspected crimes.
4 |  THE INTERVENTION: THE PARP
Between 2007 and early 2013, the PARP was implemented by the civil society organization Human Rights 
Network Uganda (HURINET-U), with financial support from the Dutch embassy in Uganda.3  The project 
was realized against the background that the police force in Uganda is widely perceived as a partisan force. 
The main concerns were brutality, lack of respect for human rights, abuse of power, and corruption.
The project objectives revolved around improving accountability and democratic governance 
within the police, in close cooperation with civil society organizations (CSOs). The assumption was 
that police integrity would be enhanced when external accountability mechanisms get established, 
as they strengthen local democratic control, citizen and media involvement (Newburn, 2015). The 
project brought together the police and civil society to foster exchange and implement external con-
trol. PARP objectives were to: (1) create stronger civilian oversight of the police, (2) establish public 
safety and security networks based on the premise of a shared responsibility between the police and 
the public, (3) enhance civil society’s contribution to the police review process, and (4) contribute 
to a public order management system that protects the rights and freedoms of Ugandans to assembly 
(HURINET-U, 2013).
The Dutch embassy funded PARP because of HURINET-U’s long-standing relationship with the 
Ugandan police force. PARP was delivered by HURINET-U in collaboration with seven other CSOs 
in the form of advocacy work, workshops involving civil society representatives, the media and the 
police, field visits, information campaigns, and radio broadcasts (HURINET-U, 2013). Next to dis-
seminating the findings of the government’s police review process and publishing an analysis of the 
Public Management Order Bill 2010, HURINET-U organized various targeted activities during the 
second phase of the PARP project. Activities included five 1-day CSO–police, three media–police, 
and two student–police dialogues, around 40 work sessions involving the police and the project 
team, and field missions to document the role of the army and police during elections, in particular 
the heavily contested general elections of 2011 (Perrot, 2014). The aim of the dialogues was to dis-
cuss the abuse of power and brutality by the police and find ways to overcome misbehavior by giv-
ing the public a role in general oversight. Further, HURINET-U distributed 700 copies of the police 
accountability newsletter Police Watch, organized visits of more than 850 citizens to police stations 
in four districts under the motto “Taking the police to the people: Enhancing accountability,” and 
arranged for 15 radio talk shows in selected districts, usually in the local language and limited in 
ambit. The police accountability newsletter and the station visits aimed to increase transparency 
and reduce the potential for corruption. HURINET-U placed particular emphasis on human rights: 
after several meetings with representatives of the Ugandan police in early August 2012, the non-
governmental organization (NGO) distributed 10,000 copies of a newly introduced complaint form 
and 5,500 copies of a complaints handling manual. The form allows the filing of complaints against 
police officers who violate human rights and act unprofessionally. In particular, the latter activities 
aimed at putting human rights at the center of the police–general public interactions.4 
The overview illustrates that PARP activities were heterogeneous and that each activity was lim-
ited in scope. The good and sustained relationship between HURINET-U and the Ugandan police was 
an important necessary condition for the implementation of PARP. HURINET-U has been present 
on the ground in Uganda since 1993, and it has actively and promptly followed up on human rights 
violations and has been in constant dialogue and exchange with the police.
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5 |  SAMPLING AND SURVEY
The implementation of PARP was limited to 11 Ugandan police districts.5  The restricted geographical 
ambit of PARP is used as a cornerstone of the empirical assessment. We sampled five districts where 
PARP activities took place and five comparable districts that were not included in the project.
We conducted a survey among 600 police officers in the 10 districts, sampling 60 officers within 
each district.6  The survey took place in April 2015. Because the survey was conducted roughly 2 
years after the end of the intervention, we can only identify effects that have “survived.” We consider 
this a strength of the analysis because assessments done right after interventions that aim to increase 
knowledge and change behavior are mainly registering immediate effects.
Individual officers were selected in a stratified way to capture officers across all ranks. The data 
collection was carried out by our local university partner, the Uganda Management Institute, in con-
sultation with the police. Police officers were approached after authorization from the police head-
quarters and the regional police. Importantly, HURINET-U did not participate in the selection of 
respondents and/or data collection.
Regional-level officers were purposively chosen to participate in the survey because of their lead-
ing position. Similarly, the leading police officers of the district headquarters were purposively in-
cluded. Police stations within districts were randomly sampled, with half the officers in our sample 
coming from small stations (with up to 10 officers) and an additional 20% from medium-sized agen-
cies (with 11–25 officers), resulting in a total of 70% of our sampled police officers being employed 
in agencies of up to 25 officers. The day of the survey was picked randomly, and police officers from 
the districts participated in the survey based on availability or presence. Because local police stations 
only have few officers, we do not expect any systematic selection of participants into our sample. We 
applied this sampling procedure to have a stratified sample of officers that represents the full spectrum 
of police work, functions, positions, and hierarchies.
The survey consisted of a self-administered pen-and-paper questionnaire in a classroom setting. 
During the survey, each officer was provided enough personal space to ensure privacy and confiden-
tiality. To protect anonymity, we did not ask the officers to provide their names or addresses. The 
survey had two parts. In the first part, officers reported their basic socioeconomic characteristics. 
In the second and core part, officers were asked to review 12 vignette cases that were formulated 
following the example of Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a, 2005b). In 
collaboration with HURINET-U and the Uganda Police Force, the cases were adapted to the local 
context to ensure that they are relevant; that is, that the vignette cases reflect dilemmas faced by 
the Ugandan police. For example, we replaced the original scenario 4 (Klockars et al., 2006): “A 
police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and 
bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.” This 
scenario had to be modified because this type of behavior is not perceived as bribery in the con-
text of Uganda. Gifts around Christmas time are considered acceptable. Similarly, because jewelry 
shops are not common in Uganda, we changed the original scenario 5 and introduced a burglary in 
a general merchandise shop. Further, we introduced the police complaint form and the treatment of 
demonstrators in other scenarios because these are important issues in the Ugandan context. The 
modified cases were pre-tested for their relevance in the field. Thus, we ensured that the changed 
case scenarios have cultural resonance. We feel that the context-specific adaptation has enhanced 
the quality of our study because it is based on an in-depth analysis of the local context and condi-
tions before the use of the scenarios.
In the survey, the cases were presented randomly to avoid an order by severity. For the sake of clar-
ity we have grouped the cases into six categories of two cases each in the paper: the first group focuses 
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T A B L E  1  Descriptive statistics of control variables
 
Overall
PARP 
participants
Non-
participants DiM
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean P-value
Socio-demographic covariates          
Age 41.785 9.426 42.244 41.457 .314
Gender: female 0.228   0.208 0.243 .317
Marital status (excluded cat-
egory: not married)
         
Married 0.843   0.852 0.837 .622
Household size 6.672 3.992 6.868 6.531 .309
Household head 0.843   0.840 0.846 .85
Education levels (excluded 
category: primary)
         
Secondary 0.455   0.476 0.44 .383
Advanced secondary 0.268   0.248 0.283 .343
Higher 0.248   0.252 0.246 .861
Income level (excluded category: 
incomes <200,000UGX)
         
Income 200,000–300,000UGX 0.115   0.144 0.094 .060*
Income 300,000–500,000UGX 0.603   0.544 0.646 .012**
Income 500,000–700,000UGX 0.140   0.148 0.134 .634
Income >700,000UGX 0.095   0.108 0.086 .360
Number of mobile phones owned 1.337 0.578 1.292 1.369 .110
Number of habitable rooms 1.750 1.103 1.924 1.626 .001***
Member of a club/organization 0.482   0.484 0.48 .923
Does sport 0.525   0.520 0.529 .836
Work-related covariates          
Police section (excluded 
category: other sections and 
duties)
         
Traffic 0.043   0.028 0.054 .119
Investigation 0.262   0.216 0.294 .032**
Intelligence 0.063   0.064 0.063 .955
General duties 0.463   0.584 0.377 .000***
Years of experience 18.800 10.556 19.384 18.383 .252
Police rank (excluded category: 
low rank)
         
High rank 0.060   0.080 0.046 .082*
Medium rank 0.322   0.300 0.337 .338
Number of rooms in the police 
station
12.758 9.259 11.472 13.677 .004***
(Continues)
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on the code of conduct among police officers, the second on bribery, the third on fraud, the fourth on 
the refusal to register a complaint against the police, the fifth on severe crimes against individuals that 
are not followed up by the police, and the sixth on undue force used by the police against suspects and 
demonstrators. A detailed grouping of the 12 cases is presented in Table A1 in Appendix A, whereas 
the exact wording can be found in Appendix B. Our survey also assessed gender dynamics, the find-
ings of which are presented in a separate article (Wagner et al., 2017).
In line with Klockars et al.’s (2000, 2006) organizational/occupational approach that was addressed 
in section 2, our survey did not directly ask police officers about their behavior to avoid biased re-
sponses. Instead, the police officers answered the following normative questions for each case:
1. How serious do you consider this behavior to be?
2. Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?
3. How serious do most police officers in your office consider this behavior to be?
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what, if any, 
disciplinary measure do you think should follow?
5. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?
The possible answer categories range on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. Questions 1 and 3 could be 
answered on a categorical scale from 1 (not at all serious) to 5 (very serious). Responses to questions 
 
Overall
PARP 
participants
Non-
participants DiM
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean P-value
Number of police cars at the 
station
1.522 1.508 1.176 1.769 .000***
Number of police motorcycles at 
the station
6.762 12.557 6.064 7.260 .250
Number of police bicycles at the 
station
2.147 5.361 2.316 2.026 .514
District-level covariates          
Population size 427,400 92,560 394,880 459,920 .292
Population growth rate 2.226 0.777 2.132 2.320 .726
Poverty head count rate 22.310 8.539 23.280 21.340 .742
Gini index 0.398 0.073 0.356 0.440 .064*
Population share belonging to 
largest ethnicity
73.980 14.454 76.240 71.720 .649
Police officers per 100,000 
inhabitants
133.214 0.090 133.261 133.166 .095*
Crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 338.232 143.510 296.802 379.662 .393
Homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants
8.629 3.910 9.629 7.628 .451
Note: The sample consists of 600 police officers, of whom 250 are PARP participants and 350 are non-participants. ***/**/* denotes 
P < .01/.05/.1, respectively. Descriptive statistics of district-level control variables are calculated on the basis of 10 district-level 
observations. DiM abbreviates difference in means, and the associated P-value is presented.
T A B L E  1  (Continued)
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2 and 5 ranged from “definitely not” to “definitely yes.” Question 4 on disciplinary measures could 
be answered with “none” [1], “verbal reprimand” [2], “written reprimand” [3], “period of suspension 
without pay” [4], “demotion in rank” [5] and “dismissal” [6].
The advantage of using vignettes is that all officers are presented with the same cases; the dis-
advantage is that we do not observe actual behavior. Clearly, we cannot determine whether police 
officers are indeed honest or corrupt. But the vignette approach has received strong validation in 
public health research, which documented consistency between hypothetical cases and actual behavior 
(Peabody et al., 2000; Van der Meer and Mackenbach, 1998).
6 |  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
6.1 | Socio-demographic characteristics of the police officers
Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
The average age of officers in the sample is almost 42 years old. Slightly less than 25% of the respond-
ents are female, and most of the officers are married (84%). On average, they live in a household with 
almost seven people, and the majority of the interviewees are household heads (84%). Almost half the 
officers have secondary education, 27% completed advanced secondary education, and 25% have a 
higher education degree. The remainder (less than 3%) has only primary education.
As to economic well-being, around 60% of the respondents earn between UGX 300,000 and 
500,000 on a monthly basis.7  On average respondents own 1.34 mobile phones and have almost 2 hab-
itable rooms at home. Membership in clubs or community organizations is reported by almost half the 
respondents, and sports activities by 53%. These latter two variables serve as controls for the activity 
levels of the respondents and their readiness to engage in extra activities.
A comparison of PARP participants and non-participants shows very few differences. All but three 
characteristics are statistically identical. Significant differences, which are controlled for in the mul-
tivariate analyses, relate to income (with PARP participants earning less than non-participants) and 
housing.
The specific police work of the respondents is part of the second set of control variables related to 
the duration of their work as police officer, their rank, the section of the police force they work in, and 
the available infrastructure at their station (Table 1).
The average length of service is 18.8 years, with no differences between PARP participants and 
non-participants. Rank, however, does seem to matter. Of all respondents, 6% are of higher ranks; 
PARP participants are more likely to hold a higher rank (8% among PARP participants versus 5% 
among non-participants) because the intervention targeted high-ranking officials. Roughly one-third 
of the officers are of middle rank; among these more officers work in non-PARP districts. The ma-
jority of the officers are of low rank; here there are no differences between our two groups of respon-
dents. The data further indicate that police officers with general duties are overrepresented among 
PARP participants, whereas significantly fewer participants work in the investigation section. Finally, 
in comparison to non-participants, PARP participants tend to come from smaller stations with fewer 
cars. Thus, policing conditions differ to some extent between the two groups, and we therefore control 
for work- and infrastructure-related variables in the analysis.
Data on the geographical distribution of the respondents form the last group of control variables 
(Table 1). As the descriptive statistics show, the control districts were well chosen because the average 
population size and growth as well as the average poverty level are identical across PARP and non-
PARP districts. Differences between PARP and non-PARP districts show up in relation to inequality 
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and the number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, but these are significant only at the 10% 
level. Average crime and homicide rates across districts are identical.
To give an overview of the composition of our sample, we provide the distribution of PARP 
participants and non-participants across districts in Appendix A1, Table A2. We show that most 
PARP participants are still located in the five districts where training activities took place, but 
roughly 13% of participating officers reside in non-targeted districts. The non-PARP district with 
the largest share of PARP participants is Iganga (6.8%). Similarly, the control sample of non-par-
ticipants is mainly drawn from the five control districts. They make up for 76% of the control 
sample. The remaining 24% of the control sample resides now in former intervention districts. 
Because this can result in potential spillover effects, we control for it in the robustness tests of our 
multivariate analysis. Furthermore, Table A2 shows that we reached the target sample of 60 partic-
ipants in all but two districts where we only sampled 59 participants. The missing two participants 
were sampled from two other districts. Thus, the extent to which police officers were affected by 
PARP activities results predominantly from work-related characteristics and community features. 
We control for these two sets of confounding factors along with the individual characteristics in 
the multivariate analyses.
6.2 | Descriptive statistics of the case assessments
Detailed descriptive statistics of the five outcome variables that we collected for the 12 cases are pre-
sented in Table 2. We show the simple averages resulting from the Likert scale answers.
Across the 12 cases and five assessment criteria PARP participants tend to be more critical com-
pared to non-participants. The first two vignette cases, on police code of conduct, are judged rather 
mildly. Receiving holidays in exchange for repairing a supervisor’s car is assessed moderately nega-
tively (average score 3.72), although officers tend to be generally aware that such behavior violates 
official policy (average score 4.24), which they would report (average score 4.06). PARP participants 
feel more strongly that disciplinary measures should follow (PARP: 4.016 versus non-PARP: 3.651). 
The misbehavior described in the second case, related to covering a drunk colleague who caused an 
accident, is by and large seen as a light offence. Overall, PARP participants and non-participants tend 
to differ on the need to report the behavior and on their judgment of the behavior, with the former 
group taking, on average, a stricter position than the latter.
The second group of cases depicts situations of bribery. Case 3 on accepting gifts while on duty has 
the lowest Likert score of all cases. All respondents are close to neutral (value of 3) when it comes to 
reporting a colleague, although PARP participants tend to be slightly more critical than non-partici-
pants. Case 4, related to the acceptance of a bribe after observed speeding, is evaluated very critically, 
as is reflected in the score of 4.58 among PARP participants and 4.22 among non-participants. Fraud 
cases are shown in the third group: case 5 (the misappropriation of money from a found wallet) and 
case 6 (illegal enrichment when investigating a burglary) are judged harshly, and a great majority of 
respondents among PARP participants and non-participants indicate they would report a colleague 
who shows this type of behavior.
Overall, the first six cases suggest that police officers have a clear idea about acceptable and 
non-acceptable behavior: the acceptance of bribes and misappropriation are evaluated more critically 
than violations of the police code of conduct. In most cases, officers see themselves as more critical 
of misbehavior than their colleagues. Responses to the question whether forms of behavior violate of-
ficial policy indicate the existence of a gap between formal rules and actual practices. Overall, PARP 
participants tend to evaluate the vignette cases more critically than non-participants.
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T A B L E  2  Descriptive statistics and comparison of means of the outcome variables
 
Severity (own 
judgment) Reporting
Severity 
(others)
Disciplinary 
measure
Official 
policy
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers
Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays
Mean PARP 
participant
4.012*** 4.408*** 3.924*** 4.016*** 4.420***
Mean non-participant 3.511 3.809 3.529 3.651 4.117
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague
Mean PARP 
participant
3.968*** 4.100*** 3.708 3.800** 4.224*
Mean non-participant 3.526 3.789 3.517 3.534 4.023
DiM: P-value (0.001) (0.007) (0.115) (0.028) (0.076)
Group 2: Bribery
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty
Mean PARP 
participant
3.788*** 3.356** 3.640*** 3.312** 4.112**
Mean non-participant 3.351 3.029 3.306 3.034 3.843
DiM: P-value (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.029)
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe
Mean PARP 
participant
4.576*** 4.476*** 4.128*** 4.404 4.684***
Mean non-participant 4.217 4.094 3.771 4.249 4.440
DiM: P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.137) (0.007)
Group 3: Fraud
Case 5: Officer taking money of found wallet
Mean PARP 
participant
4.352*** 4.564*** 4.084*** 4.360*** 4.620***
Mean non-participant 3.820 4.063 3.589 3.931 4.300
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary
Mean PARP 
participant
4.688*** 4.752*** 4.496*** 5.212** 4.736**
Mean non-participant 4.317 4.497 4.206 4.966 4.577
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.047)
Group 4: Refusal to register complaints
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant
Mean PARP 
participant
3.988*** 4.244*** 3.700** 3.624** 4.484***
Mean non-participant 3.360 3.914 3.429 3.374 4.191
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.026) (0.020) (0.004)
(Continues)
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The next two cases depict situations of how police officers deal with complaints. The refusal 
to register a complaint and the humiliation of the complainant (case 7) is judged rather mildly, 
but the majority of officers consider the arrest of a complainant on false grounds (case 8) to be 
unacceptable. This finding is in line with our expectations and shows the internal coherence 
of the vignette cases. The differences across respondents indicate that the accountability proj-
ect may have left an impact: PARP participants rate the severity of case 7 with 3.988, whereas 
non-participants rate it with 3.360. The more severe case 8 is considered as an example of serious 
 
Severity (own 
judgment) Reporting
Severity 
(others)
Disciplinary 
measure
Official 
policy
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a 1-week detention for the complainant for false accusation
Mean PARP 
participant
4.332*** 4.632*** 4.160*** 4.200 4.644
Mean non-participant 3.780 4.360 3.834 4.066 4.506
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.191) (0.115)
Group 5: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up on
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating
Mean PARP 
participant
4.532*** 4.632*** 4.312*** 4.072 4.656
Mean non-participant 4.091 4.357 3.991 3.969 4.546
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.329) (0.173)
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on
Mean PARP 
participant
4.192*** 4.648*** 4.268*** 2.744 4.684***
Mean non-participant 3.729 4.337 3.980 2.717 4.420
DiM: P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.788) (0.003)
Group 6: Undue force used by the police
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief
Mean PARP 
participant
4.228*** 4.348*** 3.964*** 3.976 4.504***
Mean non-participant 3.657 3.883 3.654 3.803 4.243
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.133) (0.010)
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration
Mean PARP 
participant
4.436*** 4.252*** 4.432*** 4.064 4.664***
Mean non-participant 3.889 3.911 4.094 3.823 4.397
DiM: P-value (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.171) (0.005)
Note: N = 600. DiM abbreviates difference in means, and the associated P-value is presented. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level, respectively. Column 1 “Severity (own judgment)” refers to question “How serious do you consider this behavior 
to be?,” Column 2 “Reporting” refers to question “Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behav-
ior?,” Column 3 “Severity (others)” refers to question “How serious do most police officers in your office consider this behavior to 
be?,” Column 4 “Disciplinary measure” refers to question “If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered 
doing so, what if any discipline do you think should follow?,” Column 5 “Official policy” refers to question “Would this behavior be 
regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?”
T A B L E  2  (Continued)
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misbehavior as indicated by the rating of 4.332 among PARP participants compared to 3.780 
among non-participants.
Lastly, cases of reported severe crimes against individuals without adequate follow-up by the po-
lice (cases 9 and 10), and of the use of undue force (cases 11 and 12) are assessed very critically. 
Again, PARP participants tend to be much more critical than non-participants, which suggests that 
officers who took part in the project apply a more careful judgment when it comes to abuse of power 
and human rights violations.
7 |  EMPIRICAL MODEL
In our identification strategy, we rely on PSM. We opted for this approach because project loca-
tions were not selected randomly and data were collected in only one round after the implementation 
of PARP. We pool the responses for all 12 cases so that we obtain an estimation sample of 7,200 
observations.
For PSM to be valid we need to impose an assumption about conditional independence, which 
states that given a set of observable covariates, which are not affected by the project (i.e., exogenous 
to PARP), potential outcomes are independent of project assignment (Lechner, 1999). It implies the 
strong assumption that the selection into PARP is solely based on observable characteristics for which 
we can control in the analysis. The preceding discussion indicated that selection into PARP appeared to 
be mainly based on work-related characteristics and community features and not on the personal char-
acteristics of police officers. We are therefore confident that we can properly capture participation with 
control variables related to individual and work-related characteristics as well as community features.
By employing a logistic regression of project allocation on the observable covariates, we determine 
the probability of participation in PARP for every police officer i based on observable characteristics:
where Di is a dummy variable coding for participation in PARP, and l[·] is the logistic function. All ob-
servable characteristics are collected in Xi, Ii, DCi, and Ci. The unobserved error term is denoted by 휀i. The 
individual characteristics are denoted by Xi, police station infrastructure by Ii, and district characteristics 
by DCi. With these control variables we account for the nested design of the study because police officers 
are integrated in police stations and police stations are organized within districts. The individual-level 
characteristics Xi are captured by age, gender, marital status, heading the household, level of education, 
level of income, number of habitable rooms in the house, household size, number of mobile phones 
owned, engagement in sport activities, and membership in an organization. In addition, we control for 
work-experience variables. These are the years of service, rank, and unit of operation. The infrastructure 
controls Ii are the number of rooms, police cars, motorcycles, and bicycles at the police station. The 
district characteristics DCi are population size (in log), population growth rate, headcount poverty rate, 
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), share of the population belonging to the largest ethnic 
group, number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, and the crime and homicide rates. Finally, we 
control for case-specific effects (Ci) to account for the differences in the severity of the presented vignette 
cases. By deriving the probability of participation from the logistic regression, we ensure that persons 
with the same observable characteristics as denoted by X, I, and DC have a positive probability of being 
both participants and non-participants, which generates the common support (Heckman et al., 1999). It 
allows us to form matches of individuals with similar characteristics observed for PARP participants and 
non-participants.
P
(
D
i
=1|X
i
,I
i
,DC
i
,C
i
)
= l[훼0+Xi훼X+ Ii훼I+DCi훼DC+Ci훼C+휀i],
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We derive the PSM estimator of the impact of PARP as the mean difference in outcome variables 
over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants:
where Y is the outcome under study, 1 represents PARP participants, and 0 non-participants. We apply 
nearest-neighbor matching by matching each individual from the group of PARP participants with suit-
able individuals from the control group. We employ the revised PSM procedure that was proposed by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008) to derive consistent standard errors.
In addition, we compare our results to an estimator that makes use of the PSM weights in a re-
gression framework, the so-called inverse probability weighting (IPW) (Wooldridge, 2007). In this 
model, the observations of the non-participants are weighted by their respective propensity scores. 
Those non-participants who share characteristics with participants, and thus have larger propensity 
scores, receive larger weights in the regression model. We derive this second estimator to gauge the 
robustness of the PSM results.
Finally, to avoid selectivity in highlighting possible effects on the five individual outcomes, we 
also employ a seemingly unrelated regression model that accounts for correlation of the error term 
across specifications, that is, multiple hypothesis testing. Moreover, the approach allows us to derive 
one single average effect of the intervention across all five outcome categories (Casey et al., 2012; 
Clingingsmith et al., 2009).
8 |  RESULTS
8.1 | Determinants of participation in PARP
Before assessing the impact of the intervention, we identify the observable characteristics that 
determine PARP participation with a logistic regression model. Table A3 (Appendix A) shows 
that the individual socio-demographic characteristics of police officers are unlikely determinants 
of participation in PARP. This applies to all individual characteristics except for being member of 
a club or community organization. Members of such organizations are more likely to participate 
in PARP. Concerning work experience-related variables, membership of particular sections within 
the police force—in particular, general service—,and holding a higher rank are positively related 
to PARP participation. These findings are not surprising because they reflect the outreach strategy 
of PARP.
District-level covariates are the most important determinants of participation in PARP, which 
suggests that HURINET-U focused on less populated and less ethnically homogeneous districts 
with higher poverty but less inequality. PARP districts appear to have more police officers and 
higher crime rates but lower homicide rates. All district-level covariates are statistically significant 
at the 1%-level and in practical terms highly relevant. The relationship with PARP activities sug-
gests that HURINET-U selected the intervention districts mainly based on perceptions of commu-
nity characteristics and the crime environment. Concomitantly, we can consider PARP activities as 
an exogenous event for the individual police officers concerned. Self-selection bias, resulting from 
unobservable individual characteristics, is unlikely. Therefore, in assessing police integrity we rely 
on the observed differences for the matched sample of PARP participants and non-participants con-
trolling for the aforementioned individual, work experience, police infrastructure, and district-level 
confounders.
휏
PSM =E {E [Y (1) |D=1,P (X,I,DC,C)]−E [Y (0) |D=0,P (X,I,DC,C)]} ,
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8.2 | Impact of PARP
Results of the comparisons of the outcome variables between PARP participants and non-participants 
are presented in Table 3. We consider the impact of the PARP intervention across the five norma-
tive questions. Panel A of Table 3 presents the simple comparison of means without accounting for 
confounding actors.
Results show that across all five questions PARP participants tend to give a more critical rating, 
with the difference being statistically significant at the 1%-level. In line with the case-specific descrip-
tive statistics (Table 2), PARP participants score higher on average, which indicates that they assess 
the depicted behavior more critically: Among PARP participants, the assessment of the perceived se-
riousness of the cases is most critical (0.49); the least critical rating is given for the action that should 
follow according to the police officers (0.22).
Next, we present the impact estimates resulting from the propensity score model (PSM, Panel B), 
those from IPW (Panel C), and the ones from the seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR, Panel D). 
The coefficient estimates are similar to the raw comparison of means. In the PSM and IPW models, the 
judgment of case severity differs by over half a point between PARP participants and non-participants 
and is highly statistically significant. This supports the conclusion that PARP had a positive impact on 
normative judgments, importantly including human rights as one of its main targets. The coefficient esti-
mate that accounts for the covariance in the error term across the five questions is smallest in magnitude 
but again it leaves no doubt that PARP participants judge case severity more critically.
With regard to reporting of misbehavior, PARP participants are on average only 0.41 points (PSM) 
more likely to report a colleague’s misbehavior. Although the coefficient on reporting is smaller in 
size than the one on case severity, it is still highly statistically significant. This suggests that PARP 
participants are not only more critical about inappropriate behavior but also more inclined to report it. 
The IPW and SUR models fully support the findings.
PARP activities also seem to have impacted on the way the judgments of fellow police officers 
are perceived. Yet, the average effect is 0.21 (=0.50–0.29) points smaller compared to the estimate 
on case severity (PSM). Police officers have the impression that colleagues consider misbehavior less 
seriously than they do themselves. PARP participants have more confidence in their own judgment 
than that of their colleagues. Again, the IPW and SUR models confirm the PSM findings with even 
slightly higher coefficients (0.39 and 0.35, respectively, compared to 0.29).
Differences among respondents are less pronounced when it comes to the disciplinary measures they 
consider appropriate in case of misdemeanors (question 4). According to the PSM model, the estimated 
difference in average scores is 0.21. This is statistically significant, but not large enough to ascribe con-
siderable impacts to PARP. Responses to question 5 indicate that PARP participants appear to know more 
about their agency’s official rules of conduct. The impact estimate of 0.27 indicates that PARP participants 
are more ready to define misbehavior as a violation of official policy. The IPW and SUR models produce 
lower coefficient estimates. Nevertheless, all differences are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
Finally, we calculate the regression-based average difference across the five questions. Calculations 
based on the PSM, IPW, and SUR model result in global average effects ranging between 0.33 and 
0.34, showing that across models we coherently identify a positive and practically meaningful impact 
of PARP. Statistical significance can only be assessed with SUR indicating that the effect is significant 
at the 1%-level.
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we employ five additional models. First, we re-
place the police-infrastructure and district-level covariates with district-level dummies (Panel E). We 
identify similar but considerably bigger effects. The findings show that the estimates presented so far 
can be seen as conservative impact estimates. From a methodological point of view, the results suggest 
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that police infrastructure and the situation in the district are related to police integrity; that is, if the 
police officers are already unsatisfied with the provided infrastructure, they are less likely to take their 
work seriously. Thus, the quality of the provided infrastructure is very likely to be reflected when the 
officers are asked about their work attitude and integrity.
Second, we further challenge the role of district-level control variables by estimating a specifica-
tion that only includes individual-level control variables. Results are presented in Table 3, Panel F. 
The coefficient estimates tend to be even larger, suggesting that we overestimate the impact of PARP 
if we fail to control for infrastructure and district variables.
Third, we address possible spillovers from PARP participants who relocated to non-PARP districts 
and vice versa by excluding PARP participants who reside in non-PARP districts and non-participants 
who reside in PARP districts (Panel F). This results in a smaller sample, as sample size drops to 5,820 
observations. The effects we identify are slightly smaller when compared to the PSM model with all 
observations and the full set of controls (Panel B). Yet, in practical terms the impacts are still mean-
ingful, and all findings are highly statistically significant. Moreover, the identified global average 
effect is bigger than the one identified with the SUR model. We prefer the original specification with 
the “movers” as it allows us to address structural effects at the district level. The spillover specification 
does not allow us to control for district-related variables as they are perfectly collinear.8  Furthermore, 
if there are indeed spillovers, it makes it more difficult for us to find an effect in general because the 
control group will also show higher support for police integrity.
Fourth, we employ an empirical specification that excludes individuals in leading positions, that 
is, those with high rank. Because the sub-sample of PARP participants has more high-ranking police 
officers, the results could have been driven by these individuals. Results of the model without police 
officers in leading positions are presented in Panel H. Except for some numerical differences our re-
sults are well aligned with those of the full model (Panel B). It is therefore unlikely that the results are 
driven by officers of high rank, who account for only 6% of the overall sample.
Fifth, in a last robustness test we excluded all “spillover” police officers along with those of high 
rank (Panel I). As for the previous specifications, the results are virtually identical with those of the 
full model (Panel B).
Further, we note that our analysis identified only the effects that have “survived,” because the 
survey was conducted roughly 2 years after the end of the PARP intervention. In research that is done 
shortly after an intervention, the analysis may pick up knowledge about best practices that is still fresh 
but that may dwindle after some time. The time lag of 2 years adds strength to our analysis as it per-
mits a focus on long-lasting impacts rather than short-term effects.
To sum up, the analyses reported previously indicate that PARP seems to have had an impact 
mainly through normative perceptions about the severity of cases. The replies of the police officers 
to the vignette cases indicate that participants in PARP activities score higher on average across 
all cases and all questions, thus indicating that PARP has been successful in creating heightened 
awareness of what is right and wrong police behavior. Most importantly, PARP was successful in 
diffusing knowledge about proper policing in relation to cases of more severe police misbehavior. 
The most noticeable differences result from the treatment of “clients” (former arrestees and sus-
pects, thieves, persons complaining), which indicates that the human rights agenda of PARP has 
been translated into better knowledge of the police officers who participated in the intervention.
In addition, our findings indicate that there seems to be a disparity between officers’ own as-
sessment of the severity of the cases and their perception of how violations should be treated. Thus, 
although police officers know the rules about good policing, they do not fully comply with those rules 
in their daily practice. This disparity may imply that official standards are only partially enforced, and 
that individual officers have room to interpret the rules to their advantage. Consequently, the change in 
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normative views about acceptable and non-acceptable behavior may not have produced a behavioral 
change of the police officers themselves.9 
9 |  CONCLUSION
The findings of our research on PARP, which was implemented in Uganda between 2010 and 2013, 
indicate that the intervention seems to have contributed to greater awareness among police officers 
about the need for on-the-job integrity and proper behavior vis-à-vis the Ugandan citizens. Comparing 
police officers who took part in PARP activities with non-participants, the attitudinal difference be-
tween the two groups on a variety of vignette cases suggests that the project has had lasting positive 
results. We conclude from our findings that police accountability may be enhanced by targeted at-
tention to unacceptable police behavior, breaches of integrity, and corruption. Yet, activities on good 
and accountable policing are not very likely to assume their full potential when used as stand-alone 
instruments; they need to be combined with credible internal enforcement mechanisms.
Our research suffers from two non-negligible limitations: First, we had to resort to a quasi-experi-
mental evaluation design. Second, we cannot fully rule out spillover effects. Future work on the impact 
of police integrity trainings should resort to more rigorous evaluation designs to gauge whether the 
current findings can be substantiated.
Although PARP activities were scattered, heterogeneous interventions, the project seems to have 
impacted on police integrity by altering the perceptions and attitudes of participating police officers. 
We cannot, however, be sure that the changes in perceptions and attitudes have translated into im-
proved practices because our survey tool does not allow us to observe behavioral outcomes. Overall, 
we conclude that the measurement and systematic analysis of (changes in) perceptions and attitudes 
remains a challenge. The findings highlight the need for future research on behavioral changes and on 
measurement of perceptions and attitudes, particularly from a comparative perspective.
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ENDNOTES
 1The non-Western countries include two low- and lower-middle-income countries (Eritrea and Pakistan), five upper-mid-
dle-income countries (Armenia, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and Thailand), and one high-income country (South 
Korea). 
 2For a more detailed discussion, the overview by Kutnjak Ivković (2015) can be consulted. 
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 3The embassy supported the project with €230,000 during the first phase (2007–2010) and €260,000 during the second 
phase (2010–2013). This article focuses on the activities implemented between 2010 and 2013. 
 4Further details about PARP can be found in Hout et al. (2016). 
 5The 11 police districts in which HURINET-U mainly worked are Arua, Bushenyi, Gulu, Kabale, Kabarole, Kampala, 
Lira, Masaka, Mbarara, Moroto, and Soroti. 
 6The survey districts are Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja Kabale, Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana, and Soroti. 
 7This roughly corresponds to a range of US$80 and 140 (UGX/USD exchange rate of 0.00028 on July 28, 2017). 
 8Concerning spillovers, we note that because HURINET-U is an NGO with limited funds, it had to restrict its work ambit 
in particular in the second phase of the program, the phase that we are evaluating. Yet, police officers in leading positions 
also meet at the national level and exchange about the activities in their districts. At the same time, we are not aware of 
any attempt from non-PARP districts to be part of the intervention, and merely hearing about PARP is not likely to change 
operations. We consider it unlikely that information about the intervention is spread very vocally because the intervention 
aims at an a priori unpopular change and implies outside involvement in operations that are traditionally considered as 
being exclusively controlled by the police. Based on our knowledge of the Ugandan context and the fact that the police is 
considered to be the most corrupt institution by the Ugandan citizens (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006a), 
we do not expect police officers to full-heartedly fight for the implementation of the complaints form, a stronger focus on 
human rights (of suspects and arrestees) and more respect for demonstrators. Lastly, the Ugandan situation is such that 
the regime, including its agents such as police officers, tries to control society (Anderson and Fisher, 2016). Therefore, it 
is a valid assumption that PARP-participants who moved to non-PARP districts are likely to have little influence on the 
behavior of their colleagues. 
 9A qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews confirms the quantitative findings. Results of the qualitative analysis can be 
found in Hout et al. (forthcoming). 
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